Feminist IR Answers

### 2ac

#### 1 – No link – we do not embrace masculinity in our affirmative – we are a break down of the way that masculinity has structured and ordered international relations discourse

#### 2 – Permute – do the Plan – we remove the masculine regime of surveillance.

#### 3 – Realism inevitable

#### 4 – Perm DO both – if they say “reject the aff” we don’t do that part

Deconstructing IR from within IR key to solve hegemonic masculinization.

Hooper, teacher of Gender politics and IR, lecturer at University of West England, 01[Charlotte, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and Gender Politics Columbia University Press, New York. p227

The power of such struggles over masculine identities, as I argue, depends to some extent on their taking part in a space that has been naturalized as a masculine space. If the environment is no longer so clearly a masculine one, then some of the imagery loses its genderspecific connotations, while the rest loses the power of naturalization. Cracks in the edifice of masculinism are appearing, not only with the arrival of feminist scholarship and a number of postpositivist fellow travelers who take gender seriously, but also in that gender issues are beginning to be addressed, however crudely, by more mainstream IR contributors.

#### 5 - Feminist international relations recreate the oppressive structures they seek to dismantle by assigning and categorizing by gender.

Stern and Zalewski 09 MARIA STERN, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. “Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization” Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals) DF

In this section we clarify what we mean by the problem of sexgender and how it transpires in the context of feminist narratives within IR – which we will exemplify below with a recounting of a familiar feminist reading of militarisation. To re-iterate, the primary reason for investigating this is that we suspect part of the reason for the aura of disillusionment around feminism – especially as a critical theoretical resource – is connected to the sense that feminist stories repeat the very grammars that initially incited them as narratives in resistance. To explain; one might argue that there has been a normative feminist failure to adequately construct secure foundations for legitimate and authoritative knowledge claims upon which to garner effective and permanent gender change, particularly in regard to women. But for poststructural scholars this failure is not surprising as the emancipatory visions of feminism inevitably emerged as illusory given the attachments to foundationalist and positivistic understandings of subjects, power and agency. If, as poststructuralism has shown us, we cannot – through language – decide the meaning of woman, or of femininity, or of feminism, or produce foundational information about it or her;42 that subjects are ‘effects’ rather than ‘origins of institutional practices and discourses’;43 that power ‘produces subjects in effects’;44 or that authentic and authoritative agency are illusory – then the sure foundations for the knowledge that feminist scholars are conventionally required to produce – even hope to produce – are unattainable. Moreover, post-colonial feminisms have vividly shown how representations of ‘woman’ or ‘women’ which masquerade as ‘universal’ are, instead, universalising and inevitably produced through hierarchical and intersecting power relations.45 In sum; the poststructural suggestion is that feminist representations of women do not correspond to some underlying truth of what woman is or can be; rather feminism produces the subject of woman which it then subsequently comes to represent.46 The implications of this familiar conundrum are far-reaching as the demands of feminism in the context of the knowledge/political project of the gender industry are exposed as implicated in the re-production of the very power from which escape is sought. In short, feminism emerges as complicit in violent reproductions of subjects and knowledges/ practices. How does this recognisable puzzle (recognisable within feminist theory) play out in relation to the issues we are investigating in this article? As noted above, the broad example we choose to focus on to explain our claims is militarisation; partly chosen as both authors have participated in pedagogic, policy and published work in this generic area, and partly because this is an area in which the demand for operationalisable gender knowledge is ever-increasing. Our suggestion is that the increasing requirement47 for knowledge for the gender industry about gender and militarisation re-animates the sexgender paradox which persistently haunts attempts to translate what we know into useful knowledge for redressing (and preventing) conflict, or simply into hopeful scenarios for our students.

#### 6 - Alt doesn’t solve – fracturing ideas of masculinity only results in more conflict

Marysia Zalewski, Reader in the Centre for Women’s Studies, and Jane Parpart, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, 98 [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p76]

Central though this binary conception of gender is to much of Western thought, it presents an illusory dichotomous opposition between genders that obscures important distinctions within masculinity and femininity. Interestingly enough, once the idea of fractures within Western conceptions of masculinity and femininity is accepted, the division between what is masculine and what is feminine tends to be less clear. Fractures within masculinity have played a crucial part in defining the relationships between the two orthodox paradigms in IR: namely realism and liberal internationalism. The division of orthodox IR into two different masculine camps has led to a competition between two aspiring hegemonic masculinities over which is more masculine (real and objective) and which should be regarded as inferior and feminine (subjective and normative)

#### 7 - Post-Cold War conceptions of peace are false → the world is inevitably realist

Ikenberry 01

(G. John, reviewing John J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, November/December 2001, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57267/g-john-ikenberry/the-tragedy-of-great-power-politics) SLS

Mearsheimer boldly states that great-power rivalry is not over. The major powers still fear each other, and dangerous security competition lurks. This view is built on an "offensive realist" theory of world politics: the deep insecurity generated by the anarchic (hence "tragic") international system leads great powers to act aggressively toward each other, thwarting rivals from gaining power even if such moves risk war. Moreover, great powers are rarely satisfied with the status quo and instead seek hegemony. Mearsheimer tests his theory across the last two centuries, citing the territorial conquests of Japan and Germany before 1945 and Soviet policies after 1917 as evidence. The United States and the United Kingdom do not fit as well into Mearsheimer's framework, but he argues that the "offshore balancing" strategies of these maritime states are just more sophisticated versions of calculated aggression. As a result, Mearsheimer predicts, the post-Cold War peace among great powers will soon end: without a peer competitor in Europe or Asia, the United States will retract its security commitments there and great-power security competition will return. But he does not make clear why the United States would act in this way -- even if it is a sophisticated power maximizer.

### Perm Solvency (1)

The perm solves best: IR criticism is only effective when it is combined with practical policy making.

Keohane, 98 (“Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist Theory” Robert O. Keohane, Duke University. International Studies Quarterly 42, 193-198. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/action/showPdf?submitPDF=Full+Text+PDF+%2889+KB%29&doi=10.1111%2F0020-8833.00076

The problem with Tickner’s dichotomies, however, goes much deeper. The dichotomies should be replaced by continua, with the dichotomous characterizations at the poles. Each analyst of world politics has to locate herself or himself somewhere along the dimensions between critical and problem-solving theory, nomothetic and narrative epistemology, and a social or structural conception of international relations. In my view, none of the ends of these continua are the optimal places to rest one’s perspective. Criticism of the world, by itself, becomes a jeremiad, often resting implicitly on a utopian view of human potential. Without analysis, furthermore, it constitutes merely the opinion of one or a number of people. On the other hand, implicit or complacent acceptance of the world as it is would rob the study of international relations of much of its meaning. How could one identify “problems” without criticism at some level? The issue is not problem-solving vs. critical theory- a convenient device for discarding work that one does not wish to accept- but how deeply the criticism should go. For example, most students of war study it because they hope to expose its evils or to control it in some way: few do so to glorify war as such. But the depth of their critique varies. Does the author reject certain acts of warfare, all warfare, all coercion, or the system of states itself? The deeper the criticism, the more wide-ranging the questions. Narrowly problem-solving work, as in much policy analysis, often ignores the most important causal factors in a situation because they are not manipulable in the short run. However, the more critical and wide-ranging an author’s perspective, the more difficult it is to do comparative empirical analysis. An opponent of some types of war can compare the causes of different wars, as a way to help to eliminate those that are regarded as pernicious; but the opponent of the system of states has to imagine the counterfactual situation of a system without states.

### Perm Solvency (2)

Perm – embrace realist ideologies ad question our epistemology. Maximizing the positives of politics and minimizing destruction is key to political and ethical responsibility.

Michael C. Williams, Senior Lecturer in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, 2005, Cambridge University Press, “The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations”

This book seeks to outline this understanding of the Realist tradition, a tradition that I call ‘wilful Realism’. The vision of wilful Realism as I try to present it here has three defining features. The first lies in its relationship to *scepticisim*. Wilful Realism is characterised by a rational questioning of the limits of reason. It is not a denial of knowledge, or of rationality, and it insists upon the importance of empirical and historical knowledge. It is**,** however, deeply sceptical – and often harshly critical – of modern empiricism and rationalism as adequate bases for political knowledge, and of the broader tendency to model knowledge after the lead of Enlightenment science. These concerns are not abstract: they are driven by the conviction that questions of knowledge and belief are crucial elements in the construction and evaluation of action and order. The sense of limits arising from this scepticism does not yield resignation or nihilism; on the contrary, it is taken as a challenge requiring the active construction of political and social order, leading wilful Realism to a continual concern with the relationship between knowledge and politics, the politics of knowledge, and a strong advocacy of the need for a politics both informed and suitably chastened by an understanding of the limits of knowledge. A second key component is *relationality*. Wilful Realism does not assume that the nature of either the self or political order is fixed or given.It focuses instead on the construction of subjectivity and political order through relational processes of self and other, at the level of both individuals and communities. This concern with relationality is historical and sociological, examining processes of constitution, maintenance, and transformation within and between political orders. It is also conceptual and philosophical. By focusing on the importance of knowledge in the construction of action wilful Realism seeks to ensure that the inescapability of relationality – of, for example, the self gaining identity in relation to others, or of concepts gaining meaning in relation to their antitheses – does not devolve into dualism: into understandings of identity or knowledge as defined wholly by opposition. This makes the concern with relationality more than just analytic: it is also part of a political and ethical sensibility in which the relationship between self and other has significance as a political principle, and constitutes one of the most important differences between wilful Realism and forms of rigidly oppositional power politics. The third dimension can, more familiarly, be termed *power politics*. Power is central to any understanding of Realism, and wilful Realism is no exception. At the centre of wilful Realism analysis is an engagement with the multiple forms of power at work in politics, including those involved in knowledge claims, forms of subjectivity, and structures of authority and action (including those that allow the effective mobilisation and exercise of material power). Beyond these analytical issues, however, there again lies a broader set of political and ethical imperatives. Politics is in this vision identifies by its specific duality: an indeterminacy that makes it at one and the same time a realm of power and inevitable struggle, *and* a realm of openness and self-determination. As a sphere of contest over the determination of values and wills, politics is an undetermined realm in which the struggle for power and domination is potentially limitless.Yet politics is also the sphere of activity uniquely concerned with the consideration, generation, and transformation of common interests and understandings: the sphere where the fundamental meanings and values of social life are contested and determined. The lack of fixed understandings of the good and the true is the condition of modern politics, and the basis of its distinctiveness as a realm of freedom, creativity, and change. Wilful Realism is deeply concerned that a recognition of the centrality of power in politics does no result in the reduction of politics to pure power, and particularly to the capacity to wield violence. It seeks, on the contrary, a politics of limits that recognises the destructive and productive dimensions of politics, and that maximizes its positive possibilities while minimising its destructive potential.

### Perm Solvency (3)

Turn—Their kritik creates a false dichotomy between total rejection and oppression—their “all or nothing” alternative dooms coalitions and closes off space for political activism

Krishna ’93 [Sankaran, Dept. of Polit. Sci., Alternatives, 1993]

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic”, essential unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear oppression, the Nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s, that according to him, was operating along obsolete lines emphasizing “facts” and “realities” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4)Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms.This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freedom movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives.The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics

### No Link

No link– there is no one form of ‘manhood’ in IR that we reinforce

Marysia Zalewski, Reader in the Centre for Women’s Studies, and Jane Parpart, professor of Gender Studies at University of Dalhousie, 98 [The 'Man' Question in International Relations, Westview Press, Boulder, p203-4]

The assertion that international politics and relations is a "man's affair" of course presupposes a single, biologically based, and largely AngloAmerican vision of masculinity. [16](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/98143764) Whereas most of the chapters in the book are situated within this cultural context, no single agreed standard of masculinity comes to the fore. Indeed, one is struck by the variety and richness of definitions of manhood and masculinity that emerge. Steve Niva described a series of shifts in the dominant/hegemonic conceptions of masculinity in the United States. The defeat in Vietnam undermined the longheld myth of the American frontiersman-warrior only to fuel a remasculinization of America in the Ramboized rhetoric of Reagan and Bush. Panama and the Gulf War thus played a central role in the reassertion and redefinition of American masculinity. To Cynthia Weber, the hypermasculine posturing during the Panama invasion signaled not strength but male hysteria over the loss of American hegemonic power. Perhaps these cracks in U.S. hegemony explain the shift to a new definition of (superior) manhood described by Niva. This new "tough but tender" version of hegemonic masculinity ridicules the "insensitive" hypermasculinity of Saddam Hussein and Manuel Noriega, celebrating instead the "new" American man who is morally responsive, sensitive to the needs of women and children, and yet able to kick butt when needed. The possibility that there is one, biologically based, predictable set of characteristics that define a "real man" dissolves in this complexity. Male associations with power, especially over women, youth, and subordinate males, are widespread (both historically and in the present), but definitions of masculinity(ies) obviously vary over time and place. [17](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/gotoDocId/98143764) The historical context, the economic, political, and cultural/social factors at play at any given time, clearly have profound implications for the way manhood and masculinities are understood and maintained. As Spike Peterson and Jacqui True reminded us, new times require new ways of thinking about gender relations and manhood/masculinity(ies). I would argue that "old times" require (re)analysis as well, for definitions of manhood and masculinity(ies) have surely varied in the past. Indeed, colonialism and imperialism profoundly shaped the emergence of a hegemonic version of Euramerican manhood, which benefited from being compared with colonial images of soft and effeminate or warriorlike but technically "backward" colonial males

### No link//IR not gender based

Gender biases in international relations don’t exist and the alternative feminist perspective is fictional as well.

Alastair J.H. Murray, Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, Reconstructing Realism, 1997, p. 192

Whilst Tickner's feminism presents an interesting revisioning of international relations, it ultimately suffers from the problem that, in order to sustain any of its claims, most of all the notion that a distinctively *feminist* epistemology is actually necessary, it must establish the existence of a gender bias in international relations theory which simply does not exist, and the existence of an 'alternative' feminist position on international affairs which is simply a fiction. Consequently, in order to salvage her very *raison d'etre*, Tickner is forced to engage in some imaginative rewriting of international relations theory. First, in order to lay the basis for the claim that an alternative perspective is actually necessary, conventional theory is stripped of its positive elements, and an easily discredited caricature, centred on realism, erected in its place. Second, in order to conjure up a reason for this alternative perspective to be a feminist one, the positive elements which have been removed from conventional theory are then claimed as the exclusive preserve of such perspectives. Yet, however imaginative this 'revisioning' of international relations theory, its inevitable result is a critique which is so riddled with contradictions that it proves unsustainable, and an alternative epistemology which, based upon this flawed critique, collapses in the face of the revelation of its inadequacy

### Alt Fails (1)

IR Feminist narrow the space for worldviews, creating “others”.

Caprioli 2004 (Mary, PhD Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota, Duluth. “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis,” International Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 253-269) BN.

Contrary to the argument that conventional IR theory excludes feminist inquiry, space exists within the field of international relations for feminist inquiry even allowing for a state-centric focus, just as room exists for scholars interested in exploring the democratic peace and ethnonationalism. International relations feminists make the same mistake that they accuse IR scholars of making: narrowing the space for various worldviews, thereby creating competition and a sense of exclusion among the so-called others. If the role of "feminist theory is to explain women's subordination, or the unjustified asymmetry between women's and men's social and economic positions, and to seek prescriptions for ending it" (Tickner 2001:11), then feminist IR scholarship ought to allow for an explanation of how women's subordination or inequality has an impact on state behavior, assuming a statecentric focus, while at the same time challenging the predetermination of a structural analysis.

Feminism can’t adequately explain international relations.

Stern and Zalewski 09 MARIA STERN, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. “Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization” Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals) DF

We argue that one of the dominant motifs or signatures of feminism within IR is one of decline and demise particularly in relation to feminism’s theoretical and methodological potential.17 These apparent tired limits of feminism within IR mirror a quandary facing feminist scholarship more generally.18 Manifestations of this quandary include a certain lassitude inflecting narratives about gender weaved through feminism parsimoniously represented,19 accompanied by a sense that feminism is becoming increasingly obsolete.20 As noted above, we investigate this quandary in order to think more deeply, if tangentially through feminism, about the limitations and accompanying violence that marks the academic production of knowledge,21 as well as to ponder feminism’s own performative function in this regard.

Feminism will never be able to resolve the question of gender identity in militarization because it cannot resolve the contradiction between sex and gender.

Stern and Zalewski 09 MARIA STERN, lecturer and researcher at the Department of Peace and Development research at Gotberg university, AND MARYSIA ZALEWSKI, Director of Centre for Gender Studies at university of Aberdeen. “Feminist fatigue(s): reflections on feminism and familiar fables of militarization” Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 611–630, Cambridge journals) DF

In familiar feminist fables of gender and militarization, gender conventionally materializes as if it were real (in a foundational sense) yet our critical feminist theorizing tells us it is a construction. We ‘know’ that when we speak woman, we re-constitute her, we construct and delimit her through our stories about her; a paradox indeed. If an apparent move is made toward gender (usually there is an assumption that this is different from, more advanced than, or more inclusive than feminist theorizations of woman) then gender metamorphoses into masculinity or femininity, or on the relations between the two in order to show how they act on, impact, influence or provide roles for the sexed body. ‘Opening’ the feminist agenda to include ‘men’ and ‘masculinity’ does not alter this dynamic. Masculinity tends also to become a (gender) ‘thing’ which we have learned, understood, imported, conveyed, tried to change; more inflections of paradox. ‘Gender’ becomes reduced to either ‘women’, ‘men’, or ‘femininity’, ‘masculinity’; and crucially we lose sight of the productive power involved – productive of the paradox mentioned above, as well as other related paradoxes such as perpetrator victim, 54 security-insecurity,55 and even war-peace.56 We suggest that being attendant to how the ‘move’ from sex to gender and the ‘move’ from a focus on ‘women’ and ‘men’ to looking at constructions of masculinity and femininity and the hierarchical relations between the two may not be as large a step away from feminism parsimoniously defined as is usually imagined. Indeed it is perhaps not a step ‘forward’ at all, as we shall illustrate. This side-step invokes the specter of anxiety as it raises questions about the possibility of responsible feminist political interventions, given the paradox with which we grapple. Importantly however, we suggest the sexgender paradox or aporia can never be successfully resolved; ‘an aporia is not a contradiction which can be brought into the dialectic, smoothed over and resolved into the unity of the concept, but an untotalisable problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its trajectory, emptying out its fullness, opening out its closure.’57 As such we see the production of sexgender as irresolvable – as a perpetual conundrum. We return to this point in our conclusion. To reiterate: through the following critical reading of a familiar feminist fable of militarisation58 we illustrate the logic which produces the paradox of feminism that demands (but ultimately belies) resolution. We explore how feminist narratives are not able to fulfil their supposed transformative promise since attempts to transgress the discursive frameworks in which they are framed are haunted; thus ensuring the failure of feminist stories. Failure, in this sense, is judged in feminism’s (in)ability to resolve its inherent contradiction.

### Alt links back

Arguing that any IR theory overwhelms the specifics of the situation is an over simplification that re-creates the hierarchies they critique.

Caprioli, 04 “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis” Mary Caprioli, Dept. of Political Science, University of Tennessee. International Studies Review. Volume 42 Issue 1 Page 193-197, March 2004. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076>).

There is little utility in constructing a divide if none exists. As Thomas Kuhn (1962) argues, common measures do exist across paradigms that provide a shared basis for theory. It seems overly pessimistic to accept Karl Popper’s ‘‘Myth of Framework,’’ which postulates that ‘‘we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories, our expectations, our past experiences, our language, and that as a consequence, we cannot communicate with or judge those working in terms of a different paradigm’’ (Neufeld 1995:44). Some feminists (for example, Tickner 1996, 2001; Peterson 2002; Steans 2003) appear to embrace this ‘‘Myth of Framework’’ by accentuating the differences between the perspectives of feminist and IR theorists based on their past experiences and languages and criticize IR theorists for their lack of communication with feminist IR scholars. Ironically, the ‘‘Myth of Framework’’ shares a number of assumptions with Hobbes’s description of the state of nature that feminists routinely reject. The ‘‘Myth of Framework’’ assumes no middle ground scholars are presumably entrenched in their own worldviews without hope of compromise or the ability to understand others’ worldviews. If this is the case, scholars are doomed to discussions with likeminded individuals rather than having a productive dialogue with those outside their own worldview. Scholars who accept the ‘‘Myth of Framework’’ have essentially created a Tower of Babel in which they choose not to understand each other’s language. The acceptance of such a myth creates conflict and establishes a hierarchy within international relations scholarship even though conventional feminists theoretically seek to identify and eradicate conflict and hierarchy within society as a whole.

### Realism Inev

War is inevitable – the anarchic system of international politics ensures that States will always be vying for power, regardless of their visible intentions

Slater 09

(Hannah Louise, reviewing John J. Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”, November 25 2009, http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/politics/1949577-tragedy-great-power-politics/) SLS

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ by John Mearsheimer, outlines his theory of “Offensive Realism”. It describes what motivates the international system and offers historical explanations as well as future predictions.  
The book begins with the central tenet of Offensive Realist theory: the international system is anarchic and this causes states to fear each other and compete for power. A state’s ultimate aim is become a hegemon because this is most secure. Thus states are constantly trapped in security competition, seeking to increase their share of world power. Mearsheimer argues that power is based on military capabilities a state possesses and the strongest power is the state with the strongest army as only land power can win a major war alone. Latent power –based upon population and wealth, which create large armies- is significant but not as important as actual power. Hesitance about using nuclear weapons means land power remains the key measure of power, while this hesitance means nuclear arsenals increase stability between great powers. Offensive Realism says configurations of power emerge across regions, affecting fear levels between states. Fear levels determine the intensity of security competition and likelihood of war. ‘Bipolarity’ causes least fear and is most stable, ‘unbalanced multipolarity’ causes most fear, thus is the least stable configuration; and ‘multipolarity’ sits in between. Mearsheimer posits that large bodies of water profoundly limit the power-projection capabilities of land forces, reducing fear and also explaining why there is no global hegemon. Offensive Realism says war is inevitable and the author argues that China and the US are “destined to be adversaries” as growing Chinese economic might translates into military might.  
Mearsheimer adds Offensive Realism to a long tradition of Realist theory, bringing some of his own ideas and combining others. He agrees with Waltz’s Defensive/Structural Realism that international anarchy causes states to engage in security competition. However he diverges from Waltz there saying, like Morgenthau’s Human Nature/Classic Realism, states will maximise their power constantly, striving ultimately for hegemony. He adds ideas such as “the stopping power of water” and he has striven to ensure his is a workable theory for explaining the past and predicting the future, making his book a significant contribution to the canon of International Relations theory. ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ challenges the Liberal paradigm to a certain extent, but Mearsheimer does this by using abundant examples to prove his points, rather than through dissecting Liberal theory. Instead he focuses more on critiquing Defensive Realism and does this throughout the book. With regard to Liberalism, Mearsheimer says that cooperation between states does exist, but only to promote a state’s selfish interests, not for the sake of world peace. Security competition remains essential in today’s world which, despite international institutions, remains anarchic. Indeed, such institutions are simply another arena for furthering national interests, he argues. So while Mearsheimer’s book does refute Liberal ideas, it is not a detailed critique instead concentrating on making the case for Offensive Realism. A fascinating and in-depth addition to Realist thought, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is a good attempt to reveal what really causes war and conflict in the international system.

Security K Answers

### Security K 2AC

1. **1. Perm – do the aff an all non-competitive parts of the alt**
2. **2. Perm – do the plan and reject securitized representations – rejecting political solutions is counterproductive – realism synthesizes critical theories in order to provide for the possibility of transition**
3. **Murray 97**
4. (Alastair J.H. Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 178-9) NS
5. In Wendt’s constructivism, the argument appears in its most basic version, presenting an analysis of realist assumptions which associate it with a conservative account of human nature. In Linklater's critical theory it moves a stage further, presenting an analysis of realist theory which locates it within a conservative discourse of state‑centrism. In Ashley's post‑structuralism it reaches its highest form, presenting an analysis of realist strategy which locates it not merely within a conservative statist order, but, moreover, within an active conspiracy of silence to reproduce it. Finally, in Tickner's feminism, realism becomes all three simultaneously and more besides, a vital player in a greater, overarehing, masculine conspiracy against femininity. Realism thus appears, first, as a doctrine providing the grounds for a relentless pessimism, second, as a theory which provides an active justification for such pessimism, and, third, as a strategy which proactively seeks to enforce this pessimism, before it becomes the vital foundation underlying all such pessimism in international theory. Yet, an examination of the arguments put forward from each of these perspectives suggests not only that the effort to locate realism within a conservative, rationalist camp is untenable, but, beyond this, that realism is able to provide reformist strategies which are superior to those that they can generate themselves. The progressive purpose which motivates the critique of realism in these perspectives ultimately generates a bias which undermines their own ability to generate effective strategies of transition. In constructivism, this bias appears in its most limited version, producing strategies so divorced from the obstacles presented by the current structure of international politics that they threaten to become counter‑productive. In critical theory it moves a stage further, producing strategies so abstract that one is at a loss to determine what they actually imply in terms of the current structure of international politics. And, in post‑modernism, it reaches its highest form, producing an absence of such strategies altogether, until we reach the point at which we are left with nothing but critique. Against this failure, realism contains the potential to act as the basis of a more constructive approach to international relations, incorporating many of the strengths of reflectivism and yet avoiding its weaknesses. It appears, in the final analysis, as an opening within which some synthesis of rationalism and reflectivism, of conservatism and progressivism, might be built.

**3. Perm – do the plan and position yourself as a critical intellectual in order to re-think securitization – representations of security can be changed**

1. **4. Perm – do the alt – conditionality justifies**

**5. Our advantage is an impact turn to this criticism - ……**

**6. No link, impact inevitable and alt doesn’t solve – treating security as a speech act means there are an infinite number of security threats, making it impossible to solve. Securitization is only when used by actors in positions to make security choices, it doesn’t apply to us.**

**Williams 3** (Michael C., university of Whales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, [International Studies Quarterly](http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=intestudquar), Vol. 47, No. 4) CC

This stance allows the Copenhagen School to argue simultaneously for both an expansion and a limitation of the security agenda and its analysis. On the one hand, treating security as a speech-act provides, in principle, for an almost indefinite expansion of the security agenda. Not only is the realm of possible threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threatened (what are termed the "referent objects" of security) can be extended to include actors and objects well beyond the military security of the territorial state. Accordingly, the Copenhagen School has argued that security can usefully be viewed as comprising five "sectors," each with their particular referent object and threat agenda (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998).6 In the "military" sector, for example, the referent object is the territorial integrity of the state, and the threats are overwhelmingly defined in external, military terms. In the "political" sector, by contrast, what is at stake is the legitimacy of a governmental authority, and the relevant threats can be ideological and sub-state, leading to security situations in which state authorities are threatened by elements of their own societies, and where states can become the primary threat to their own societies. Even further from an exclusively military-territorial focus is the concept of "societal" security, in which the identity of a group is presented as threatened by dynamics as diverse as cultural flows, economic integration, or population movements. Conversely, while treating security as a speech-act allows a remarkable broadening of analysis, securitization theory seeks also to limit the security agenda. Security, the Copenhagen School argues, is not synonymous with "harm" or with the avoidance of whatever else might be deemed malign or damaging (Buzan et al., 1998:2-5, 203-12). As a speech-act, securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of "security." These constraints operate along three lines. First, while the securitization process is in principle completely open (any "securitizing actor" can attempt to securitize any issue and referent object), in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference. Not all claims are socially effective, and not all actors are in equally powerful positions to make them. This means, as Buzan and Waever put it, that the "Conditions for a successful speech-act fall into two categories: (1) the internal, linguistic-grammatical-to follow the rules of the act (or, as Austin argues, accepted conventional procedures must exist, and the act has to be executed according to these procedures); and (2) the external, contextual and social-to hold a position from which the act can be made ('The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked')" (Buzan et al., 1998:32). The claims that are likely to be effective, the forms in which they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from which they can effectively be spoken are usually deeply "sedimented" (rhetorically and discursively, culturally, and institutionally) and structured in ways that make securitizations somewhat predictable and thus subject to probabilistic analysis (Waever, 2000)-and not wholly open and expandable. Finally, while empirical contexts and claims cannot in this view ultimately determine what are taken as security issues or threats, they provide crucial resources and referents upon which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue.

**7. Threats are real – Use your 1ac as specific proof**

**8. We must confront threats – key to prevent ceding the political – does not preclude the transformative potential of securitization**

**Franke 9**

(Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 92-93)JFS

Apocalypse prima facie refuses and makes an end of dialogue: it thunders down invincibly from above. But for this very reason the greatest test of our dialogical capacity is whether we can dialogue with the corresponding attitude or must resort to exclusionary maneuvers and force. What is called for here is a capacity on the part of dialogue not to defend itself but to let itself happen in interaction with an attitude that is apparently intolerant of dialogue. Letting this possibility be, coming into contact with it, with the threat of dialogue itself, may seem to be courting disaster for dialogue. It is indeed a letting down of defenses. Can dialogue survive such a surrendering of itself in utter vulnerability to the enemy of dialogue? Or perhaps we should ask, can it rise up again, after this self-surrender, in new power for bringing together a scattered, defeated humanity to share in an open but commonly sought and unanimously beckoned Logos of mutual comprehension and communication? May this, after all, be the true and authentic “end” of dialogue provoked by apocalypse? For what it is worth, my apocalyptic counsel is that we must attempt an openness to dialogue even in this absolute vulnerability and risk. The world is certainly not a safe place, and it will surely continue not to be such, short of something … apocalyptic. Needed, ever again, is something on the order of an apocalypse, not just a new attitude or a new anything that we can ourselves simply produce. Philosophy itself, thought through to its own end, can hardly resist concluding that “only a god can save us” (Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten). But can not our attitude make a difference- perhaps make possible the advent of apocalypse beyond all our powers, even those of our own imaginations? I will wager an answer to this question only in the operative mood. May we bring a voice speaking up for mutual understanding onto the horizon of discourse in our time, a time marked by the terrifying sign of apocalyptic discourse. May we do this not by judging apocalyptic discourse, but by accepting that our condition as humans is as much to be judged as to judge and that all our relatively justified judgments are such to the extend that they offer themselves to be judged rather than standing on their own ground as absolute. In other words, may our discussions remain open to apocalypse, open to what we cannot represent or prescribe but can nevertheless undergo in a process of transformation that can be shared with others – and that may be genuinely dialogue.

**9. Case outweights – the only impact to securitization is inaccurate constructions that they say spills over into all of their other impacts – we’re winning our threats are real and that we should confront them, which means our threat of extinction should come first**

**10. No impact – security discourse isn’t inherently bad — presenting it in debate allows the negative attributes to be avoided**

**Williams 3** (Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), AD: 7-10-9)

I have argued thus far that recognizing the roots of securitization theory within the legacy of a Schmittian-influenced view of politics explains a number of its key and most controversial features. Charges of an ethically and practically irresponsible form of objectivism in relation to either the act of securitization or the concept of societal security are largely misplaced. Locating the speech-act within a broader commitment to processes of discursive legitimation and practical ethics of dialogue allows the most radical and disturbing elements of securitization theory emerging from its Schmittian legacy to be offset. Seen in this light, the Copenhagen School is insulated from many of the most common criticisms leveled against it.

**11. Alt doesn’t solve the case – rejecting orientalist discourse doesn’t prevent money laundering in Yemen, which triggers all of our impacts**

**12. No spillover and impact is inevitable – even if they win our threats are constructions, they’re embedded in US policymaking now, which means policymakers will continue to act according to realist assumptions even if they’re based on faulty representations  
Williams 3**

(Michael, Prof. of International Politics at the Univ. of Wales, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 511-531)

The first, and simplest point is that in some ways the Copenhagen School treats securitization not as a normative question, but as an objective process and possibility. Very much like Schmitt, they view securitization as a social possibility intrinsic to political life. In regard to his concept of the political, for example, Schmitt once argued,

It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or whether it is perhaps strong pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all. The concern here is neither with abstractions nor normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of making such a distinction. One may or may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves according to the friend–enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere (1996 [1932]: 28).30 In certain settings, the Copenhagen School seems very close to this position. Securitization must be understood as both an existing reality and a continual possibility. Yet equallyclearly there is a basic ambivalence in this position, for it raises the dilemma that securitization theory must remain at best agnostic in the face of any securitization**,** even, for example, a fascist speech-act (such as that Schmitt has often been associated with) that securitizes a specific ethnic or racial minority. To say that we must study the conditions under which such processes and constructions emerge and become viable is important but incomplete, for without some basis for avoiding this process and transforming it the Copenhagen School appears to risk replicating some of the worst excesses made possible by a Schmittian understanding of politics.

**13. Realism is inevitable and necessary – failure to incorporate realist understandings detaches us from politics, which makes true change impossible**

**Guzzini 1998**, Stefano (Assis. Prof @ Central European U), Realism in Int’l Relations, p. 212

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew**.** This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily languagefor making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding ofour (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and publicwhether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisionsnot only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite fortheir very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the namealthough not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.Alt fails

### 1ar: Alt Fails

#### JUST REJECTING SECURITY POLITICS REPRODUCES SOVEREIGNTY AND EXPLOITATION. ONLY POLITICAL ACTION CAN END GLOBAL OPPRESSION

Agathangelou & Ling ’97 Anna M. Agathangelou**,** Dir. Global Change Inst. And Women’s Studies Prof at Oberlin, and L.H.M. Ling, Institute For Social Studies at The Hague, Fall 1997, “Postcolonial Dissidence within Dissident IR: Transforming Master Narratives of Sovereignty in Greco-Turkish Cyprus,” Studies in Political Economy, v. 54, pp. 7-8

Yet, ironically if not tragically, dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims that a “coherent” paradigm or research program — even an alternative one — reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden powermongering of sovereign scholarship. “Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives,” writes Jim George “must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in readymade alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them. Even references to a “real world, dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality. What dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that “resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities.” Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact. It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action. Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take “a critical distance” or “position offshore’ from which to “see the possibility of change.” But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes “critically” from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.

### Permutation Solvency

#### Combining Realism and Reflectivist thinking produces the most effective form of politics

Murray 97

(Alastair, Professor in the Politics Department at the University of Wales Swansea, Reconstructing Realism)

For the realist, then, if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic, critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive. If the former can justifiably be criticised for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently, thus perpetuating its existence and legitimating its errors, reflectivist theory can equally be criticised for searching for a tomorrow which **may never exist**, thereby **endangering** the possibility of establishing any form of **stable order** in the **here and now**. Realism's distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of **synthesis** between rationalism and reflectivism might be achieved. Oriented in its genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory project, it is centrally motivated by a concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying a technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can **simultaneously** acknowledge the **possibility of change** in the structure of the international system and the need to **probe the limits of the possible**, and yet also **question the proximity** of any international transformation, emphasise the **persistence of problems** after such a transformation, and serve as a **reminder** of the need to grasp whatever **semblance of order** can be obtained in the **mean time.** Indeed, it is possible to say that realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation. Simultaneously to critique contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Yet, because it grasps the **essential ambiguity** of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows **neither to predominate**, achieving, if not a reconciliation, then at least a **viable synthesis.** Perhaps the most famous realist refrain is that **all politics are power politics.** It is the all that is important here. Realism lays claim to a relevance across systems, and because it relies on a conception of human nature, rather than a historically specific structure of world politics, it can make good on this claim. If its observations about human nature are even remotely accurate, the problems that it addresses will transcend contingent formulations of the problem of political order. Even in a genuine cosmopolis, conflict might become technical, but it **would not be eliminated** altogether. The primary manifestations of power might become more economic or institutional rather than (para)military, but, where disagreements occur and power exists, the employment of the one to ensure the satisfactory resolution of the other is inevitable short of a wholesale transformation of human behaviour. Power is ultimately of the essence of politics; it is not something which can be banished, only **tamed and restrained.** As a result, realism achieves a universal relevance to the problem of political action which allows it to relate the **reformist zeal** of critical theory, without which advance would be impossible, with the problem-solver's **sensible caution** that, before reform is attempted, whatever measure of **security** is possible under contemporary conditions must first be ensured.